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MULLIGAN v. CORBETT: THE COURT’S POWER TO DECIDE 
WHEN YOUR CHILD IS NOT YOURS TO KEEP 
LISA M. PICCININI∗ 
In Mulligan v. Corbett,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ad-
dressed the issue of whether a man claiming to be the biological fa-
ther of a child conceived during a wedded woman’s separation from 
her husband could require the child to undergo DNA testing.2  Alt-
hough the child was born after the divorce was finalized,3 the ex-
husband, Thomas Mulligan, agreed to act as the child’s father and 
bring her into his household.4  The court held that William Corbett, 
the man that claimed to be the child’s biological father,5 must rebut 
the child’s presumed legitimacy6 before using the Family Law Article 
to establish paternity.7  In applying that standard, the court concluded 
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 1.  426 Md. 670, 45 A.3d 243 (2012). 
 2.  Id. at 672, 45 A.3d at 244. 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id. at 682, 45 A.3d at 250. 
 5.  Id. at 683, 45 A.3d at 250–51.  
 6.  A presumption of legitimacy is established in the Maryland code: “A child born or 
conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses.”  MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 7.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260–61.  The Family Law Article of the 
Maryland Code provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Requests and orders for tests.—(1) The Administration may request the 
mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests. (2) If the 
mother, child, or alleged father fails to comply with the request of the Admin-
istration, the Administration may apply to the circuit court for an order that di-
rects the individual to submit to the tests.  
(b) In general.—On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceed-
ing, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged 
father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged fa-
ther can be excluded as being the father of the child.  
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029 (LexisNexis 2012). 
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that Corbett’s paternity claim did not overcome that presumption.8  
Thus, Corbett had to use the more difficult standard in the Estates 
and Trusts Article to establish his biological link to the child.9 
The court correctly recognized that a child is presumed legiti-
mate when conceived during marriage10 or when a man has estab-
lished paternity by way of the legitimization section of the Estates and 
Trusts Article.11  The court, however, incorrectly interpreted that pre-
sumption as barring other men claiming paternity from bringing suit 
under the Family Law Article.12  At minimum, the court should have 
allowed Corbett to challenge the child’s paternity under the Family 
Law Article, ordering blood testing upon a showing of reasonable evi-
dence that he was the child’s father.13  Ideally, instead of requiring a 
man to overcome the child’s presumed legitimacy, the court should 
have allowed the presumption of legitimacy to stand unless and until 
it was re-established in another man.14 
                                                        
 8.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260–61. 
 9.  Id.  Maryland courts have consistently considered a request for blood testing un-
der the Estates and Trusts Article as a physical examination under Rule 2-423 of the Mary-
land Rules and required a showing of good cause. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-423 (LexisNexis 2013); 
see Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 113, 607 A.2d 935, 939 (1992) (“A motion for blood 
tests made under the Estates & Trusts Article is best analyzed as a request for a physical 
examination under Maryland Rule 2-423, and the court has discretion to grant or deny the 
blood tests.”); see also, e.g., Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 767, 621 A.2d 898, 902 (1993) 
(following Turner).  When applying the good-cause standard in paternity actions pursuant 
to the Estates and Trusts Article, courts consider whether blood testing is in the best inter-
ests of the child.  See Ashley v. Mattingly, 176 Md. App. 38, 58–63, 932 A.2d 757, 769–772 
(2007) (reviewing Maryland precedent and finding that a court must consider the best 
interests of the child before ordering genetic testing under the Estates and Trusts Article). 
 10.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 11.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 677, 45 A.3d at 247.  The legitimization section of the Estates 
and Trusts Article provides: 
(a) Child of his mother.—A child born to parents who have not participated in a 
marriage ceremony with each other shall be considered to be the child of his 
mother. 
(b) Child of his father.—A child born to parents who have not participated in a 
marriage ceremony with each other shall be considered to be the child of his fa-
ther only if the father: 
  (1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action brought un-
der the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; 
  (2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father; 
  (3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or 
  (4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself, 
orally or in writing, to be the father.  
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208. 
 12.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260.   
 13.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 14.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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I.  THE CASE 
Amy Mulligan divorced her husband, Thomas Mulligan, in Sep-
tember 2009.15  Earlier that year, during her separation, Amy Mulligan 
began dating a man named William Corbett.16  They almost immedi-
ately tried to conceive a child, and Amy Mulligan soon informed Cor-
bett that she was pregnant.17  In August 2009, Amy Mulligan and her 
three children moved into Corbett’s Pennsylvania home; however, af-
ter only a month, Corbett demanded that Amy Mulligan and her 
children leave his home.18  Amy Mulligan and her children returned 
to Maryland and soon after moved in with Thomas Mulligan.19 
On January 3, 2010, Gracelyn was born.20  Amy Mulligan called 
Corbett that evening to tell him of Gracelyn’s birth.21  Corbett came to 
the hospital the next day, at which time Amy Mulligan asked him to 
sign the affidavit of parentage for Gracelyn’s birth certificate.22  In re-
sponse, Corbett asked for a paternity test so he could be “100 percent 
sure” that he was the father.23  When Amy Mulligan refused, Corbett 
left the hospital.24  Thomas Mulligan told Amy Mulligan to put his 
name down on the affidavit, saying he “would love to be the baby’s fa-
ther” if Corbett was unwilling to sign the certificate.25   
On February 3, 2010, Corbett informed Amy Mulligan, through 
counsel, that he wished to have genetic testing to show Gracelyn’s 
parentage.26  If the child was his, Corbett wanted to be “legally recog-
nized” as Gracelyn’s biological father and to “attain some of the 
                                                        
 15.  Corbett v. Mulligan, 198 Md. App. 38, 42, 16 A.3d 233, 235 (2011), vacated sub nom. 
Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 45 A.3d 243 (2012).  The complaint for divorce, filed 
May 6, 2009, stated that the Mulligans had “lived separate and apart” since April 4, 2008.  
Id. at 47, 16 A.3d at 237–38.  They had three children together (excluding Gracelyn).  Id. 
at 42, 16 A.3d at 234.  
 16.  Id. at 42, 48, 16 A.3d at 235, 238.  
 17.  Id. at 48, 16 A.3d at 238.  The Court of Appeals explained in more detail that the 
pair “discussed their mutual desire” to have a child and timed their sexual intercourse with 
Amy Mulligan’s menstrual cycle in April 2009.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 680, 45 A.3d at 249. 
 18.  Corbett, 198 Md. App. at 44, 16 A.3d at 236.  Their disagreement stemmed at least 
partially from financial difficulties and how to discipline the children. Id. at 45 n.4, 16 A.3d 
at 236 n.4.  
 19.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 680, 45 A.3d at 249. 
 20.  Corbett, 198 Md. App. at 42, 16 A.3d at 235. 
 21.  Id. at 46, 16 A.3d at 237.  Amy Mulligan contacted Corbett at Thomas Mulligan’s 
urging.  Id. at 44, 16 A.3d at 236. 
 22.  Id. at 46, 16 A.3d at 237. 
 23.  Id. at 48, 16 A.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24.  Id. at 46, 16 A.3d at 237. 
 25.  Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 682, 45 A.3d 243, 250 (2012) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 26.  Id. 
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rights, privileges, and obligations of parenthood.”27  Specifically, Cor-
bett noted that if Gracelyn was his child, he wanted to negotiate a vis-
itation schedule and to establish child support.28  Amy Mulligan did 
not respond, and Corbett filed a Complaint for Paternity, Child Sup-
port, and Visitation Schedule in the Circuit Court for Frederick 
County.29 
Amy Mulligan moved to dismiss Corbett’s complaint, maintain-
ing that Gracelyn was the legal child of Thomas Mulligan and thus 
her paternity was not in dispute.30  Amy Mulligan reasoned that, un-
der the Estates and Trusts Article, the mother’s husband at the time 
of conception or birth is the presumed biological father of the child in 
question.31  Because Gracelyn was conceived before Amy Mulligan’s 
divorce was finalized, Thomas Mulligan was the child’s presumptive 
father.32 In response to Amy Mulligan’s motion to dismiss, Corbett 
clarified that he had the right to obtain DNA testing under the Family 
Law Article’s Paternity subtitle because the child was not born during 
an “intact” marriage.33  According to Corbett, Gracelyn was born out 
of wedlock and subject to mandatory blood testing because she was 
conceived when the Mulligans had separated and ceased sexual rela-
tions and, additionally, because she was born after the divorce was fi-
nalized.34 
The circuit court agreed with Amy Mulligan and found that it was 
inappropriate to apply the Family Law Article’s Paternity subtitle, 
which is reserved for instances when a child’s paternity is “void”; in 
this case Gracelyn’s paternity was not void but instead presumed in 
Thomas Mulligan.35  Applying the Estates and Trusts Article, the court 
                                                        
 27.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28.  Id.   
 29.  Id. at 682–83, 45 A.3d at 250. 
 30.  Corbett v. Mulligan, 198 Md. App. 38, 42, 16 A.3d 233, 235 (2011), vacated sub nom. 
Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 45 A.3d 243 (2012). 
 31.  Id. at 52, 16 A.3d at 241.  
 32.  Id.  Gracelyn was conceived while the Mulligans were married but separated.  Id. at 
59, 16 A.3d at 244.  Under the Estates and Trusts Article, the presumption of a child’s le-
gitimacy can only be overcome by “sufficient persuasive force.” Id. at 42–43, 16 A.3d at 235 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 33.  Id. at 43, 16 A.3d at 235. 
 34.  Id.  Interestingly, Thomas Mulligan had a vasectomy in 2005.  Id. at 44 n.3, 16 A.3d 
at 236 n.3.  Amy Mulligan testified in her divorce action that she and Thomas Mulligan 
had not had sexual relations since April 4, 2008.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 680–81, 45 A.3d at 
249.  
 35.  Corbett, 198 Md. App. at 49, 16 A.3d at 239. The circuit court noted the presump-
tion of Gracelyn’s legitimacy was not sufficiently overcome by the testimony of Thomas 
Mulligan, who acknowledged that he might not be the biological father because he had 
undergone a vasectomy in 2005.  The court also noted the testimony of Amy Mulligan, 
  
2013] MULLIGAN v. CORBETT 55 
took into consideration the best interests of the child before ordering 
any genetic testing.36  The court determined that Gracelyn was part of 
“an intact family” and was “‘well cared for, well loved, [and] well 
nourished’” and, therefore, a paternity test, which could possibly sep-
arate her from Thomas Mulligan, was not in her best interests and 
should not be ordered.37 
Corbett appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.38  
The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings, concluding that because Gracelyn was conceived 
while the Mulligans were legally separated and born when they were 
divorced, she was born out of wedlock and thus subject to mandatory 
blood testing under the Family Law Article.39  The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to resolve whether the paternity of a child 
conceived during marriage but born after divorce should be ruled by 
the Estates and Trusts Article or the Family Law Article.40 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Any modern paternity case in Maryland draws from the State’s 
long history of protecting the traditional family unit.41  This history 
includes a collection of family laws, focused on legitimizing as many 
children as possible,42 and inheritance laws, aimed at simplifying the 
transfer of estates.43  Although both family and inheritance laws in 
Maryland may be used to establish paternity, the former require 
blood testing when requested by the court or any party, while the lat-
ter require blood testing only when it is in the best interests of the 
                                                        
who said “the odds were pretty good this man [Corbett] was the father of [her] daughter.”  
Mulligan, 426 Md. at 683–84, 45 A.3d at 251.   
 36.  Corbett, 198 Md. App. at 49–50, 16 A.3d at 239. 
 37.  Id. at 50, 16 A.3d at 239. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 60, 16 A.3d at 245. 
 40.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 672, 45 A.3d at 244. 
 41.  See Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 268–72, 545 A.2d 55, 56–58 (1988) (discussing the 
history of Maryland paternity laws and their purpose); see also infra Part II.A. 
 42.  “The presumption of legitimacy was a fundamental principle of the [English] 
common law[,]” adopted in full by the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion); State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 486, 
365 A.2d 988, 990 (1976).  
 43.  The purpose of the Estates and Trusts Article is “to simplify the administration of 
estates, to reduce the expenses of administration, to clarify the law governing estates of 
decedents, and to eliminate any provisions of prior law which are archaic, often meaning-
less under modern procedure and no longer useful.”  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-
105 (LexisNexis 2011). 
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child.44  In other words, when a case is brought under the Family Law 
Article, the man challenging or asserting paternity is always entitled to 
blood testing; when a case is viewed under the Estates and Trusts Arti-
cle, however, the man’s request for blood testing is only granted if the 
court finds that it is in the best interests of the child.45  Accordingly, 
the decision to apply the Family Law Article or the Estates and Trusts 
Article is critical to the outcome of a case.  This decision often turns 
on whether the child was born “out of wedlock.” 46   
A.  Modern Paternity Case Law Is Built on a Foundation of Family and 
Inheritance Laws 
The history of legal paternity mirrors society’s evolving views on 
gender equality.47  Historically, the man of the house laid claim over a 
woman and her children.48  This concept of ownership was rooted in 
overt sexism, reflecting society’s desire for men to protect and guide 
the more impressionable female sex, and their children, from immo-
rality and temptation.49  In addition to the State’s interest in preserv-
ing the traditional family unit, men had the impetus to recognize 
their children to insure they could inherit.50  Historical views of wom-
en and children are integral to understanding today’s paternity pro-
ceedings. 
1.  Maryland Family Law Reflects the Legislature’s Focus on Keeping 
Families Intact to Avoid Financial Burdens on the State and the 
Social Implications of One-Parent Families 
The Maryland legislature historically sought to prevent the birth 
of illegitimate children by protecting married mothers and punishing 
                                                        
 44.  See infra Part II.B.  
 45.  See infra Part II.B. 
 46.  See infra Part II.C. 
 47.  See Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 272, 545 A.2d 55, 58 (1988) (noting the pro-male 
tilt of early paternity laws). 
 48.  See Rex v. De Manneville, 5 East 221, 223, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055 (K.B. 1804) 
(“[The father] is the person entitled by law to the custody of his child.”). 
 49.  For a demonstration of this sexism in practice, see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 
141 (1872)(“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. . . .  The paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and moth-
er.”). 
 50.  See Harris v. Brinkley, 33 Md. App. 508, 514–15, 365 A.2d 304, 309 (1976) (noting 
that the Estates and Trusts Article protects an illegitimate child’s right to inherit if the de-
ceased biological father had openly and notoriously recognized the child as his own dur-
ing his lifetime).  
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unmarried mothers.51  An unwed mother’s child was considered an 
illegitimate “bastard.”52  The woman was shamed for the perceived 
lack of morality and the financial burden her pregnancy imposed on 
the state.53  Accordingly, the state implemented criminal penalties for 
mothers bearing illegitimate children.  The penalties eventually be-
came civil,54 but the underlying purpose of those laws, and their pre-
sumption in favor of legitimacy, remain the basis for Maryland’s con-
temporary paternity and inheritance statutes.55 
Beginning in 1715, Maryland regulations provided corporal pun-
ishment for “[w]omen who have Bastards, and do refuse to discover 
the Father or Begetter of such Children.”56  In 1781, the corporal 
punishment aspect of the law was replaced with a requirement that 
unmarried women post security indemnifying the county from sup-
porting the child, name a putative father to post the security, or face 
jail time.57  Over a century later, in 1941, the Maryland legislature 
amended the Bastardy and Fornication Article of the Maryland Code 
to incorporate the innovation of blood testing.58  The amendments 
granted a putative father the right to order a blood test, precluding 
his designation as the father in a judicial proceeding.59  This right was 
solely for exculpatory purposes, providing relief to men who were not 
the biological father of a child born to an unwed mother; the 
                                                        
 51.  To achieve that end, the Maryland legislature made it extremely difficult to dis-
prove the presumed legitimacy of a married woman’s child.  See Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md. 
118, 133, 31 A. 498, 501 (1895) (referring to the presumption of legitimacy of a married 
couple’s child as a “true rule . . . which the experience of many years and the wisdom of 
eminent judges have sanctioned”), overruled in part by Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 241 
A.2d 682 (1968). 
 52.  See Sweet v. Hamilothoris, 258 P. 652, 655 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927) (equating ref-
erences to a “child born out of wedlock,” an “illegitimate child,” and a “bastard”).   
 53.  Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 269, 545 A.2d 55, 56 (1988). 
 54.  Id. at 271, 545 A.2d at 57. 
 55.  Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., 129 Md. App. 260, 284, 741 A.2d 553, 566 (1999) (“The 
legal determination of paternity was, and is, a means to confer upon a child whose biologi-
cal parents were not married the common law and statutory rights that he would have if 
his biological parents had been married.”), aff’d sub nom. Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 
754 A.2d 369 (2000). 
 56.  The regulation provided for “[w]hipping upon . . . their bare Bodies, till the 
Blood do appear, [by] so many Stripes not exceeding Thirty nine.”  Eagan, 313 Md. at 268–
69, 545 A.2d at 56 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57.  Id. at 269, 545 A.2d at 56.  “Putative father” means the “‘alleged biological father 
of a child born out of wedlock.’” Stubbs v. Colandrea, 154 Md. App. 673, 683, 841 A.2d 
361, 367 (2004) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 58.  Lowell R. Bowen, Blood Tests and Disputed Parentage, 18 MD. L. REV. 111, 114–15 
(1958). 
 59.  Eagan, 313 Md. at 269–70, 545 A.2d at 56–57. 
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amendments did not give mothers comparable access to blood testing 
when attempting to prove a man’s paternity.60 
Maryland fully replaced criminal penalties with civil penalties in 
1963 when it enacted the Paternity Proceedings of the Maryland 
Code.61  The State had charged a commission to study the problems 
surrounding illegitimacy.62  The commission’s report recommended 
an overhaul of Maryland’s law to curtail the effects of illegitimacy on 
children and the state, as well as to rectify “the apparent pro-male tilt 
[the statutes] seem to suggest (a slant quite consistent with the early 
history of paternity laws).”63  The law began to protect unwed mothers 
by granting them access to the blood-testing technology putative fa-
thers had been able to use for over forty years.64  As a result, any party 
to the proceedings, rather than just the alleged father, could seek 
court-ordered blood tests to exclude a putative father or to confirm 
fatherhood.65  Additionally, in response to a federal regulatory 
scheme to prevent out-of-wedlock pregnancies, the new law also pro-
vided that “[n]othing in this subtitle may be construed to limit the 
right of a putative father to file a complaint to establish his paternity 
of a child.”66 
                                                        
 60.  See id. at 270, 545 A.2d at 57 (“This new addition was patently for the benefit of the 
defendant.”); see also Bowen, supra note 58, at 120 (“[U]nder the Maryland statute blood 
tests are available only to the defendant to prove exclusion . . . .”). 
 61.  Eagan, 313 Md. at 271, 545 A.2d at 57. 
 62.  The study was specifically directed towards examining illegitimacy among welfare 
recipients, reflecting the public concern about the costs of single-mother households.  Id. 
at 272, 545 A.2d at 58. 
 63.  Id.  The commission claimed this “tilt” was a result of the criminal nature of the 
proceedings, noting that many fathers had been able to “escape any responsibility for the 
maintenance of their illegitimate children” because of the high standard of proof in criminal 
cases.  Id.  The legislature sought to address that flaw by replacing the criminal standards 
with a civil law avenue to establishing paternity.  Id. 
 64.  This was accomplished through an amendment in 1976 and more significant legis-
lation in 1982.  Id. at 273, 545 A.2d at 58. 
 65.  Id.  This change allowed blood tests to be received into evidence if they demon-
strated at least a 97.3% probability of the putative father’s paternity.  Id.  In 1984, another 
amendment prohibited the court from using its discretion to reject a qualifying blood test.  
Id. 
 66.  Stubbs v. Colandrea, 154 Md. App. 673, 680, 686–89, 841 A.2d 361, 365, 369 
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Federal Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 conditioned federal funds on state imple-
mentation of programs to combat out-of-wedlock pregnancies.  Id.  It required states to 
give “[p]utative fathers . . . a reasonable opportunity to initiate a paternity action.”  Id. at 
686, 841 A.2d at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This Act was passed following 
the 1975 Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, which conditioned assistance 
to single mothers and their children upon their cooperation in attempting to identify their 
children’s father.  Id. at 684–85 n.4, 841 A.2d at 368 n.4.  
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The new paternity law did not, however, entirely replace the old 
paternity laws—importantly, it incorporated the historical “‘rebuttable 
presumption that the child is the legitimate child of the man to whom 
its mother was married at the time of conception.’”67  The Paternity 
Proceedings are now encapsulated in the Family Law Article of the 
Maryland Code.68 
2.  Maryland Inheritance Law Simplified How an Unmarried or Non-
Biological Father May Establish Paternity 
Paternity law necessarily intersects with inheritance law.69  For ex-
ample, when a married woman gives birth, the law presumes her hus-
band is the biological father, and thus the child may inherit property 
even if the father dies without a will.70  If, however, a woman is unmar-
ried when she gives birth and no man subsequently establishes pater-
nity, the child is not entitled to receive property upon the intestate 
death of her biological father.71  Thus, a child’s right to inherit hinges 
on her legitimacy. 
                                                        
 67.  Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 677, 45 A.3d 243, 247 (2012) (citation omitted). 
The presumption of legitimacy also extends, through the legitimization section of the Es-
tates and Trusts Article, to an unwed woman whose children are treated as the legitimate 
issue of a man.  See Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 768–69, 621 A.2d 898, 903 (1993) 
(holding that the unwed mother was not entitled to disestablish paternity of a man who 
was known to the children as their father).  
 68.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-1001—1048 (LexisNexis 2012).  
 69.  See Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 481, 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990) (explaining that 
because the Paternity subtitle and the Estates and Trusts Article “purport to deal with the 
same subject matter, they must be construed together”).   
 70.  See Dep’t of Human Res. ex rel. Duckworth v. Kamp, 180 Md. App. 166, 196–97, 949 
A.2d 43, 61 (2008) (citing § 5-1027 of the Paternity Act), aff’d sub nom. Kamp v. Dep’t of 
Human Res., 410 Md. 645 980 A2d 448 (2009).  When a married man dies without a will, 
his wife receives his full estate.  If the wife is also deceased, however, the estate is “divided 
equally among the surviving issue.”  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-103 (LexisNexis 
2011).  
 71.  This rule draws from common law and has been altered by statutes.  In 1849, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland explained the then-new statutory construction allowing ille-
gitimate children to inherit:  
By the common law, bastards, having no inheritable blood, are incapable of tak-
ing as heir either to the putative father, mother or anyone else . . . .  [I]t has al-
ways been a prominent object to prevent the mischiefs of illicit intercourse . . . .  
The infamy of the transgression descended to the child, while the estate of the 
parent passed over to the more distant kindred . . . .  The bastard is still nullius 
filius.  The sin of the parent still attaches to the child in this respect; but so far as 
the Legislature could justly temper the severity of the sentence . . . they have 
done so.  The act of 1786 . . . reserves to the guilty parents the locus penitentiæ.  By 
marriage and subsequent adoption of the child, the sin is atoned for . . . and the 
child to all intents and purposes, is here legitimated.  
Miller v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Pub. Sch., 8 Gill 128, 130–31 (Md. 1849). 
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Inheritance itself is recognized as a sacred legal right.72  In ac-
cordance with that sanctity, Maryland courts have held that the Es-
tates and Trusts Article of the Code is not limited to inheritance mat-
ters, but can be used to establish other, “ofttimes inferior” rights such 
as paternity.73  In Dawson v. Eversberg,74 for example, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that a man is not required to adopt children 
for them to inherit his property; rather, a man can use the various 
channels in section 1-208 of the Estates and Trusts Article to 
acknowledge them as his own.75  The court noted that an acknowl-
edgment of paternity under this Article brings with it all the rights 
and responsibilities of fatherhood, as if he had been married to the 
mother when the child was born.76  This process of legitimization, the 
court explained, is “less traumatic” and thus more preferable than 
adoption.77  Since Dawson, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly con-
cluded that any of the four methods in section 1-208 of the Estates 
and Trusts Article suffice to establish paternity.78  As such, Maryland 
                                                        
Today, a child born to unmarried parents may be legitimized, and thus inherit even 
in the absence of a written will, by means less drastic than adoption.  Namely, a father may 
legitimize his child simply by recognizing him pursuant to section 1-208 of the Estates and 
Trusts Article.  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-108.  
 72.  See Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 542, 283 A.2d 777, 780 (1971) (“[N]o right or 
privilege in the history of the common law, or in statutory law, is accorded greater sanctity 
than the right of inheritance.”); Pell v. Ball’s Ex’rs, 18 S.C. Eq. (1 Rich. Eq.) 361, 377,361, 
377 (S.C. 1845) (“At law, a man’s inheritance is sacred . . . .”). 
 73.  See Thomas, 263 Md. at 542, 283 A.2d at 780 (noting “[t]he trend of the courts 
throughout the country . . . to give a liberal interpretation to legitimation statutes or legis-
lation which seeks to achieve that purpose”). 
 74.  257 Md. 308, 262 A.2d 729 (1970). 
 75.  Id. at 313–15, 262 A.2d at 732–33. 
 76.  See id. (noting that a declared father would give the children inheritance rights 
and would be responsible for contributing support).  Section 1-208 of the Estates and 
Trusts Article provides four avenues for establishing paternity: (1) a judicial determination 
“under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings;” (2) the father “acknowledge[s] 
himself, in writing to be the father;” (3) the father  “openly and notoriously recognize[s] 
the child, in writing, to be his child;” or (4) the father “subsequently marrie[s] the mother 
and  . . . acknowledge[s] himself, orally or in writing, to be the father.” MD. CODE ANN., 
EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (LexisNexis 2011); Dawson, 257 Md. at 314, 262 A.2d at 732. 
 77.  Dawson, 257 Md. at 314, 262 A.2d at 732. 
 78.  See, e.g., Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 112, 607 A.2d 935, 938 (1992) (reiterat-
ing that the Estates and Trusts Article is an alternative method to seek blood tests for the 
purpose of establishing paternity); Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 479, 578 A.2d 761, 765 
(1990) (“That § 1-208(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article is a legitimating statute is clear 
from our cases.”); Thomas, 263 Md. at 539, 283 A.2d at 779 (recognizing the legitimacy of 
children when several elements set forth in the Estates and Trusts Article section 1-208 
have been met); Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 630, 241 A.2d 682, 688 (1968) (“[W]e see 
no reason why the child’s rights to inherit . . . should in any respect depend on wheth-
er . . . paternity was established in a paternity proceeding . . . or in an equity proceeding 
like the case at bar.”), superseded by statute on other grounds. 
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law reflects a consistent preference toward fostering legal relation-
ships between an unmarried woman’s child and her father. 
B.  Unlike Mandatory Blood Testing Under the Family Law Article, 
Maryland Courts Grant Blood Testing Under the Estates and Trusts 
Article Only If It Is in the Best Interests of the Child 
The Family Law Article and the Estates and Trusts Article pre-
scribe different avenues to legitimize a child.  The touchstone of pa-
ternity cases in Maryland is Turner v. Whisted,79 in which a likely biolog-
ical father sought to establish paternity of a child born five months in-
into the mother’s marriage to another man.80  Because the child was 
born during a marriage, and thus legitimate and exempt from man-
datory blood testing under the Family Law Article, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff’s only option was to petition for blood testing 
under the Estates and Trusts Article.81  If the blood tests showed that 
the husband was not the father, the plaintiff would have sufficiently 
rebutted the child’s presumptive legitimacy, and he could then em-
ploy one of the methods under the Estates and Trusts Article to legit-
imize the child as his own.82  The court explained that, whereas it 
must grant blood tests under the Family Law Article, it treats the re-
quest for a blood test under the Estates and Trusts Article as a motion 
for mental or physical examination under Maryland Rule 2-423.83  
Under that rule, the motion is only granted if there is a showing of 
“good cause,” including a judicial determination of the competing in-
terests at hand.84  That determination, the Turner court ruled, necessi-
tates an inquiry into the best interests of the child to determine 
whether DNA testing should be granted.85  Turner “remains the con-
trolling precedent for cases . . . where two men . . . acknowledge the 
paternity of a child born during a marriage.”86 
                                                        
 79.  327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992). 
 80.  327 Md. at 109, 607 A.2d at 936–37. 
 81.  Id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938–39. 
 82.  Id. at 112–17, 607 A.2d at 938–940; see supra note 76. 
 83.  See Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 939 (referencing MD. R. 2-423). 
 84.  Id. at 114, 607 A.2d at 939. 
 85.  Id. at 116–17, 607 A.2d at 940.  The court provided the following considerations 
for determining the best interests of the child: “the stability of the child’s current home 
environment, whether there is an ongoing family unit, and the child’s physical, mental 
and emotional needs”; “the child’s past relationship with the putative father”; and “the 
child’s ability to ascertain genetic information for the purpose of medical treatment and 
genealogical history.” Id. 
 86.  Evans v. Wilson, 382 Md. 614, 636, 856 A.2d 679, 692 (2004); see also, e.g., Ashley v. 
Mattingly, 176 Md. App. 38, 62, 932 A.2d 757, 772 (2007) (allowing discretion in ordering 
genetic testing to determine paternity because the child was born during the parties’ mar-
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It is clear that the article under which an alleged father pursues 
paternity action can greatly impact the outcome of his case.  For ex-
ample, in Miles v. Stovall,87 the appellant’s ex-wife had given birth to a 
child during their marriage, but the child was conceived prior to their 
vows.88  The court noted that the Family Law Article only presumes le-
gitimacy for children conceived during marriage, and the child at issue 
was not.89  The court turned instead to the Estates and Trusts Article, 
which holds the same presumption for children born or conceived dur-
ing marriage, and ordered the trial court to consider the best interests 
of the child before granting blood testing.90  Miles demonstrates how 
the Family Law and Estates and Trusts Articles serve similar purposes 
but can lead to different results depending on the mother’s marital 
status.  For example,  consider the following two scenarios.  In the 
first, a child is born to an unwed woman, and no man voluntarily as-
serts his paternity.  The mother’s sole option in terms of establishing 
paternity is through the mandatory blood testing provision of the 
Family Law Article.  The man will be held responsible for the child 
only if the blood test proves he is the biological father.  In the second 
scenario, a child is born to a married woman, but by a man other than 
her husband.  The husband’s only mode of recourse is to use the Es-
tates and Trusts Article to argue that it would be in the best interests 
of the child for him to usurp his parental responsibilities in light of 
the child not being his (which, as Miles demonstrates, is an unconvinc-
ing argument.91  In sum, the Family Law Article is a surefire form of 
relief for an unmarried man who is not the biological father of a 
child, while the Estates and Trusts Article can be used to keep a non-
biological father supporting his wife’s children. 
                                                        
riage, despite the possibility the husband was not the natural father).  Conversely, where 
no man claims to be the father of the child, Maryland courts order DNA testing without 
considering the best interests of the child.  See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 424–25, 754 
A.2d 389, 404–05 (2000) (reviewing the mandatory nature of Family Law Article section 5-
1029 as evidenced by the plain language of the statute). 
 87.  132 Md. App. 71, 750 A.2d 729 (2000). 
 88.  Id at 81, 750 A.2d at 735. 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 81–83, 750 A.2d at 735–36. 
 91.  Id. at 82–33 & n.5, 750 A.2d at 736 & n.5.  
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C.  Maryland Courts Understand the Term “Born out of Wedlock” as 
Having Two Definitions That Bear Differently on the State’s Policy of 
Legitimizing as Many Children as Possible 
A child born out of wedlock is illegitimate by law.  The two terms, 
however, are not interchangeable.92  Legitimacy refers to the relation-
ship between a child and his parents, while wedlock refers to the sta-
tus of the parents’ relationship at the time of the child’s birth or con-
ception.93  Accordingly, a child born illegitimate may later become 
legitimate; a child born out of wedlock will always have been born out 
of wedlock. 
Legitimacy is a fairly straightforward concept, turning upon only 
whether the child has a legal father.94  The term “born out of wed-
lock” is more ambiguous, as it describes two distinct situations.95  A 
child is born out of wedlock when she is “[b]orn to an unmarried fe-
male,” or “born to a married female but begotten during the continu-
ance of the marriage status by one other than her husband.”96 It is 
simple to identify a child is born out of wedlock when the mother is 
unmarried at both conception and birth; it is more difficult to label a 
child born out of wedlock when the mother is married, because the 
husband is the presumptive father. 
Still, Maryland law characterizes a child in either situation as 
born out of wedlock and thus subject to the Family Law Article.97  The 
Family Law Article protects children covered under the first definition 
(born to an unmarried mother) by allowing the mother to apply for 
relief from the putative father.98  In comparison, the Family Law Arti-
cle does not add any protection to children falling under the second 
definition (born to a married mother by a man other than her hus-
band), as those children are already presumed legitimate under 
                                                        
 92.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted this distinction between col-
loquial and legal terminology, explaining that “[i]n common parlance ‘illegitimate child’, 
‘natural child’, and ‘bastard’ are interchangeable terms connoting a child born of wed-
lock.  But the law of Louisiana . . . makes a sharp legal [distinction]” between those classes. 
Lathan v. Edwards, 121 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1941).  Cf. Henderson v. Henderson, 64 
Md. 185, 190–91, 1 A. 72, 74 (1885)(suggesting that the terms “out of wedlock,” “illegiti-
mate,” and “bastards” are synonymous).  
 93.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1731(9th ed. 2009). 
 94.  Id. at 984.  
 95.  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 149, 580 (3d ed. 1969).  
 96.  Id. at 149; see also Lewis v. Schneider, 890 P.2d 148, 149–50 (Colo. App. 1994) (list-
ing nine jurisdictions that construe the phrase to refer to both circumstances).  
 97.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1002 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 98.  See Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 275, 545 A.2d 55, 69 (1988) (noting that the 1963 
Paternity Proceedings emphasized “easing the task of holding men responsible for support 
of their illegitimate children”). 
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common law.99 Precedent has not clearly determined where a child 
falls in the scheme of legitimacy when she was conceived by extramar-
ital relations during the mother’s separation from her husband.100 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Mulligan v. Corbett, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed 
the judgment of the circuit court, holding that Gracelyn was pre-
sumptively legitimate because she was conceived during Amy Mulli-
gan’s marriage to Thomas Mulligan.101  Based on the determination of 
legitimacy, the court also upheld the circuit court’s decision to apply 
a best interests analysis under the Estates and Trusts Article to deter-
mine whether Corbett’s request for blood testing should be grant-
ed.102 
The court explained that although the facts of this case were 
novel, precedent indicated that the Estates and Trusts Article should 
govern.103  After exploring eight cases in depth to determine what fac-
tual patterns warrant the use of the Family Law Article instead of the 
Estates and Trusts Article, the court found that each statutory scheme 
has a distinct use.104  Specifically, the court determined that the Pater-
                                                        
 99.  Although the Family Law Article covers both children born to an unmarried 
mother and children born to a married woman but conceived by a man other than her 
husband, courts have not applied the Article to protect a husband under the second factu-
al scenario.  See, e.g., Ashley v. Mattingly, 176 Md. App. 38, 42, 62, 932 A.2d 757, 759, 772 
(2007) (noting that even though independent testing showed that the mother’s husband 
was not the child’s father, he was not entitled to testing under the Family Law Article be-
cause the child was born during the parties’ marriage).   
 100.  The United States District Court for the District of Maryland has addressed the 
issue of divorce as it relates to illegitimacy.  See Metzger v. S.S. Kirsten Torm, 245 F. Supp. 
227, 233–34 (D. Md. 1965) (holding that the mother’s children from a previous marriage 
could not recover from her current husband’s death because the divorce did not render 
them illegitimate, nor did the second marriage render them the legitimate issue of her 
second husband).  
 101.  Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 700, 45 A.3d 243, 261 (2012). 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 695, 699–700, 45 A.3d at 258, 260. 
 104.  Id. at 686–95, 45 A.3d at 252–58. The cases explored include Kamp v. Dep’t of Hu-
man Servs., 410 Md. 645, 678, 980 A.2d 448, 461–62 (2009) (holding that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in ordering DNA testing of a child born during marriage without tru-
ly considering the child’s best interests); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 
411 (2000) (enforcing a putative father’s absolute right to blood testing under the Family 
Law Article to disprove paternity); Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 526–27, 639 A.2d 1076, 1083 
(1994) (holding that, although the child’s biological father was a man other than the 
woman’s husband at the time of birth, a best interests analysis was appropriate to deter-
mine paternity); Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 771, 621 A.2d 898, 904 (1993) (describing 
the policies underlying the Estates and Trusts Article and the Family Law Article as indicat-
ing that “[t]he best interest of a child born out of wedlock but subsequently treated as if it 
were the legitimate issue of the man who married its mother is not necessarily served by 
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nity Proceedings under the Family Law Article provide a “sword”105 to 
unmarried mothers by which they may obtain support from the bio-
logical father; they also provide a “shield,” protecting putative fathers 
from paternity determinations when they are not in fact the biological 
father.106  Alternatively, the court explained that the Estates and Trusts 
Article is properly used when a man wants to establish paternity of an 
illegitimate child.107  Or, the court further noted, if the child is already 
legally recognized as one man’s child, a different man may petition 
for genetic testing under the Estates and Trusts Article to rebut the 
child’s legitimacy and to establish paternity in himself.108  The court 
emphasized that a petition for genetic testing must take into account 
the best interests of the child.  Thus, the petition may be denied if the 
child is better served by remaining legitimate under his currently rec-
ognized father.109 
The Court of Appeals rejected the rational of the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals that Gracelyn was born out of wedlock and thus subject 
to mandatory blood testing under the Paternity Proceedings if re-
quested by either party.  Instead, because Gracelyn was conceived be-
fore Amy Mulligan’s divorce was finalized, she was born into wedlock 
and was therefore presumed the legitimate child of Thomas Mulli-
gan.110  This strong presumption, the court concluded, put Gracelyn 
out of reach of the required DNA testing under the Paternity Pro-
ceedings of the Family Law Article.111  Accordingly, the circuit court 
was correct in applying the Estates and Trusts Article to Corbett’s 
                                                        
establishing that that man is not the biological father, without a concomitant establish-
ment of paternity in someone else”); Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 109, 117, 607 A.2d 
935, 936, 940 (1992) (requiring use of the Estates and Trusts Article in the paternity case 
of a child conceived prior to, but born during, marriage); Evans v. Wilson, 382 Md. 614, 
633, 856 A.2d 679, 690 (2004) (explaining that a man is not entitled under section 5-
1002(c) of the Family Law Article to challenge the paternity of a child born during mar-
riage because he cannot be a putative father if the child is already legitimate); Ashley v. 
Mattingly, 176 Md. App. 38, 62, 932 A.2d 757, 772 (2007) (discussing the necessity of a best 
interests analysis when a child was born into marriage but conceived prior to the mar-
riage); Stubbs v. Colandrea, 154 Md. App 673, 689, 841 A.2d 361, 370 (2004) (reserving the 
use of the Family Law Article for children “born out of wedlock,” rather than born during 
marriage). 
 105.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 698–99, 45 A.3d at 260. 
 106.  Id. at 698, 45 A.3d at 260. 
 107.  Id. at 678, 45 A.3d at 248.  The majority used the terms “illegitimate” and “out-of-
wedlock” interchangeably.  Id. at 696, 45 A.3d at 258. 
 108.  Id. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260. 
 109.  Id. at 672, 45 A.3d at 244.  The court relied on the Turner-Evans line of cases to 
determine the “best interests” of a child.  Id. at 699, 45 A.3d at 260. 
 110.  Id. at 700, 45 A.3d at 261. 
 111.  Id. at 699, 45 A.3d at 260. 
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claim and using a best interests analysis to deny his request for blood 
testing.112 
Judge Barbera dissented, with Judge Raker joining, to reject the 
majority’s decision that a child conceived during marriage and born 
after divorce is not born out of wedlock for the purposes of applying 
the Family Law Article.113  The dissent argued that a child may be 
born to a married mother but still qualify as illegitimate if the child 
was conceived by a man other than her husband.114  Accordingly, the 
dissent argued that the determination to use the Family Law Article or 
the Estates and Trusts Article depends on an evaluation of the child’s 
legitimacy rather than whether she was born into wedlock.115 
To support her conclusion, Judge Barbera evaluated the Paterni-
ty subtitle, which presumes that “the child is the legitimate child of the 
man to whom its mother was married at the time of conception.”116  
The dissent asserted that the majority’s treatment of “born into wed-
lock” and “legitimate” as synonymous makes the Paternity subtitle su-
perfluous because there could never be a case where a child con-
ceived in marriage is also illegitimate.117  Because the majority’s 
interpretation of “legitimate” would render the Paternity subtitle su-
perfluous, violating principles of statutory construction, the legislative 
intent behind the Family Law Article must require a different inter-
pretation: Although Gracelyn was born into wedlock, she was not le-
gitimate because the parties agreed she was probably not the biologi-
cal child of Thomas Mulligan.118  The dissent concluded that this 
acknowledgment placed Gracelyn’s legitimacy into question and 
made utilization of the Family Law Article—requiring DNA testing 
upon request—appropriate without judicial consideration of Grace-
lyn’s best interests.119  Judge Barbera further suggested that the Estates 
and Trusts Article is only applicable where the identity of the child’s 
biological father is undisputed, while the Family Law Article is appli-
                                                        
 112.  Id. at 700, 45 A.3d at 261. 
 113.  Id. at 700–01, 45 A.3d at 261 (Barbera, J., dissenting). 
 114.  Id. at 706–07, 45 A.3d at 265.  Specifically, Judge Barbera posited that “‘legitimacy’ 
describes the legal status of the parent-child relationship,” while “‘born out of wedlock’ 
describes the mother’s marital status in relation to the child’s biological father at the time 
of the child’s birth.”  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 707, 709, 45 A.3d at 265–66. 
 116.  Id. at 708–09, 45 A.3d at 265–66 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 117.  Id. at 709, 45 A.3d at 266. 
 118.  Id. at 716–17, 45 A.3d at 270–71. 
 119.  Id. at 714, 45 A.3d at 269. 
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cable where the biological relationship between the father and child 
is contested.120 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Mulligan v. Corbett, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
a child, conceived during marriage but born after divorce, is the legit-
imate child of the ex-husband, whose paternity may not be challenged 
by another man unless doing so is in the best interests of the child.121  
The court reasoned that the Family Law Article, which mandates 
blood testing a child upon the request of any party, including a puta-
tive father, does not govern when a child is presumed legitimate un-
less that presumption is rebutted.122  The court’s decision erred in 
three ways: it failed to follow the plain language and intent of the 
Family Law Article;123 it failed to address paternity cases in which two 
men assert fatherhood;124 and, importantly, it did not necessarily re-
sult in the best outcome for the child.125  Furthermore, even if the 
movant must rebut a presumption of legitimacy to establish paternity 
under the Family Law Article, the burden on plaintiffs is unreasona-
ble.126  Finally, a more appropriate rule would recognize that a child’s 
presumed legitimacy stands unless and until it is re-established in an-
other man, therefore allowing a man to bring suit under the Family 
Law Article without fully rebutting the presumption of legitimacy.127  
Such a rule would subject Gracelyn to mandatory blood testing under 
the Family Law Article but would preserve her legitimacy as Thomas 
Mulligan’s child unless the results showed she was in fact Corbett’s 
child.128 
A.  The Majority Rule Has Several Fatal Flaws 
Under the Mulligan court’s ruling, a man claiming paternity of a 
child already presumed legitimate may petition for relief only under 
the Estates and Trusts Article.129  Under that Article, a man asserting 
                                                        
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 700, 45 A.3d at 261 (majority opinion). 
 122.  Id. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260. 
 123.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 124.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 125.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 126.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 127.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 128.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 129.  Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 687, 693, 699–700, 45 A.3d 243, 253, 257, 260–
61 (2012). 
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biological paternity is not granted access to blood testing unless the 
court determines that such testing is in the best interests of the 
child.130  The court’s rule is misguided in light of the legislative intent 
of the Family Law Article, the reality of paternity actions, and the in-
herent difficulty of best interests analysis. 
1.  The Majority Rule Did Not Align with the Statutory Intent 
Underlying the Family Law Article 
The majority suggested that a strong presumption of legitimacy is 
instrumental to keep families intact131 and hold fathers accountable.132  
In accordance with these policy objectives, after characterizing Grace-
lyn as “legitimate,” the majority employed the Estates and Trusts Arti-
cle instead of the Family Law Article.133  That decision led to the 
court’s conclusion that Corbett did not convincingly show that it was 
in Gracelyn’s best interests to order blood testing.134  The court’s focus 
on Gracelyn’s legitimacy, however, ignores the legislative intent be-
hind, and plain language of, the Family Law Article. 
The Family Law Article’s rebuttable presumption of legitimacy 
demonstrates the legislature’s intent to protect the legitimacy of all 
children when there is no man actively asserting paternity.135  It is not 
meant to apply in lawsuits where multiple men claim paternity.  In-
deed, the legislative findings included in the statute state that 
“[n]othing in this subtitle may be construed to limit the right of a pu-
tative father to file a complaint to establish his paternity of a child.”136  
Even the Estates and Trusts Article, which does not expressly propose 
to protect children but is instead concerned with simplifying estates, 
notes that all presumptions are rebuttable.137 
The court ignored the plain language of both statutes in two 
ways: first, by allowing only men who have rebutted the child’s pre-
sumption of legitimacy to access mandatory blood testing; and sec-
ond, by setting an unreasonably high hurdle for rebuttal.138  Indeed, 
what more could Corbett have done to rebut Gracelyn’s presumption 
                                                        
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 689–90, 45 A.3d at 254–55. 
 132.  Id. at 676–77, 45 A.3d at 247.  
 133.  Id. at 700, 45 A.3d at 261. 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Any party to a proceeding may order DNA testing under the Family Law Article to 
establish or disestablish paternity.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029. (LexisNexis 2012). 
 136.  Id. § 5-1002.  
 137.  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 138.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260–61. 
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of legitimacy?  The facts supporting rebuttal were multiple: Corbett 
and Amy Mulligan intentionally tried to get pregnant; Amy Mulligan 
was not having sexual relations with Thomas Mulligan at the time 
Gracelyn was conceived; even if they had engaged in sexual inter-
course, Thomas Mulligan had undergone a vasectomy years prior; and 
finally, Amy Mulligan asked Corbett to sign the affidavit of parentage 
to indicate paternity.139  The court’s decision to uphold Gracelyn’s 
presumption of legitimacy despite the above facts indicates that the 
presumption is not truly rebuttable. 
The court’s decision also failed to recognize that the legislature’s 
intent in creating a presumption of legitimacy was to protect women 
and children in cases unlike the one at hand.  In Gracelyn’s case, a 
man actively asserted his paternity.140  There was no concern that she 
would end up without a legal father.141  The court’s rule restricting 
contests of paternity to the Estates and Trusts Article, and then to a 
high standard for ordering blood tests, fails to promote the general 
welfare and best interests of children;142 the best interests of a child 
are not likely jeopardized in a paternity suit like Mulligan. 
2.  The Majority Rule Does Not Align with the Reality in Mulligan 
and Many Other Paternity Suits 
The majority rule requiring a man to overcome a strong pre-
sumption of legitimacy is unnecessary considering the practical reali-
ties surrounding paternity suits.143  In many paternity suits, the familial 
integrity, which the legislature aimed to protect with a strong pre-
sumption of legitimacy, is already broken.144  The legal system inher-
ently prevents frivolous suits when a family is intact, or when the child 
                                                        
 139.  See supra Part I.  
 140.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 682–83, 45 A.3d at 250–51. 
 141.  Id.   
 142.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1002 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 143.  Namely, the need to protect an existing family unit by a strong presumption of 
legitimacy is missing in many paternity suits.  See, e.g., Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 518–20, 
528–29, 639 A.2d 1076, 1079–80, 1084 (1994) (holding that, where a wife’s soon-to-be ex-
husband was not the biological father of her child, the trial court erred in attempting to 
protect the “family integrity” because there was no integrity to protect). 
 144.  See, e.g., Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 123 n.2, 607 A.2d 935, 943 n.2 (1991) 
(Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s concern for the 
integrity of familial relationships already formed ignores the reality of the present case. . . . 
It is unclear whether it is possible to protect the ‘integrity of the familial relationships al-
ready formed,’ as it is not evident that any such relationship exists.”).  Indeed, the tradi-
tional family structure, which the statutes aim to protect, may be elusive in “a generation in 
which traditional families are almost as often the exception as the rule.”  Janet L. Dolgin, 
Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. 
REV. 523, 533 (2000). 
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is the offspring of the mother’s husband, because a man has no in-
centive to petition for paternity unless he is the likely father.  Consid-
ering the costs of bringing a paternity suit, it would be a rare occur-
rence for a suit to be initiated simply to annoy or hassle the legitimate 
parents of a child.145  Thus, while the presumptive legitimacy of chil-
dren born into marriage is important,146 it should not trigger the ma-
jority’s near impossible standard.147   
3.  The Majority Rule Does Not Necessarily Create the Best Result for 
the Child 
The court’s focus on a strong presumption of legitimacy is not 
necessarily in the best interests of the child, another primary purpose 
of the Family Law Article’s Paternity Proceedings and a consideration 
in the application of the Estates and Trusts Article.148  In Turner v. 
Whisted, the dissent argued against the notion that “people’s best in-
terests are served by ignorance of the facts, enforced by a governmen-
tal entity.”149  Indeed, just the opposite—people’s best interests are 
never served by ignorance—should be the rule.150  In this case, Grace-
lyn was denied certainty regarding her biological father’s identity.151  
But, it is not within the court’s expertise152 to decide when a child’s 
                                                        
 145.  Even an unmarried biological father may not have much incentive to argue pater-
nity since a determination of paternity triggers child support responsibilities.  See, e.g., Pe-
trini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 460–61, 648 A.2d 1016, 1019 (1994)(discussing the mandatory 
increase in child support payment calculations in the 1990s).   
 146.  Note, Status of Issue of Void Marriages, 56 HARV. L. REV. 624, 625 (1943)(explaining 
that while a strong presumption of legitimacy does “much to alleviate the plight of chil-
dren born out of lawful wedlock,” legislation has effectively solved “the predicament of the 
illegitimate child without actually legitimating him”).   
 147.  Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 710–11, 45 A.3d 243, 267 (2012) (Barbera, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the procedure by which a putative father may obtain blood test-
ing). 
 148.  See Kamp v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 410 Md. 645, 678, 980 A.2d 448, 468 (2009) 
(noting the necessity of considering the best interests of the child before ordering a blood 
test). 
 149.  Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 124, 607 A.2d 935, 944 (1992) (Eldridge, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
 150.  See Stephen J. Betchen, Why Adoptees Need to Find Their Biological Parents, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/magnetic-partners/201104 
/why-adoptees-need-find-their-biological-parents (describing one adopted man’s “linger-
ing fear that [he] might drop dead at any moment” because of a lack of vital health infor-
mation from his birth parents). 
 151.  See Mulligan, 426 Md. at 719–20, 45 A.3d at 273 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the evidence presented was sufficient to call into question the identity of Gracelyn’s 
biological father). 
 152.  Even with the evidence presented to a court, its ability to rule on the best interests 
of the child is limited in these cases, as the truth in paternity suits is often obscure “be-
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paternity should be determined through DNA testing or resigned to a 
presumption.153  This exercise of “big brother”154 power is inappropri-
ate considering the court’s ability to determine custody and inability 
to predict the future needs of the child.155 
While the court’s expertise is appropriate in custody considera-
tions, the court should not choose whether to reveal a child’s biologi-
cal father in paternity actions.156  In Gracelyn’s situation, the court 
cannot be confident that it has ruled in Gracelyn’s best interests.157  
First, the stigma attached to illegitimacy is lessening in light of socie-
ty’s changing views on single-parent households.158  A single mother 
and her child, even if born out of wedlock, do not face the same stig-
ma they once did.  Regardless of society’s dislike of single-mother 
households, they are nonetheless increasing in prevalence.159  Other 
                                                        
cause social pressures create a conspiracy of silence, or worse, induce deliberate falsity.” 
Cortese v. Cortese, 76 A.2d 717, 719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950).   
 153.  Professor Dolgin explained this problem as follows: 
[A] number of . . . cases . . . “represent the willingness of courts to predicate par-
ticular familial relationships on a judge’s sense of what . . . should have been, and 
in doing that, to contravene, or simply to ignore, apparent facts about both biol-
ogy and behavior.  In such cases, the law strives to sustain a traditional image of 
family, but in doing that, relies on a presumption that can be conclusively dis-
proved by accurate paternity testing.”  
Dolgin, supra note 144, at 531. 
 154.  Turner, 327 Md. at 126, 607 A.2d at 945 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  For a helpful discussion of the “‘right to know one’s biological origins’” argument 
in Canada, see Timothy Caulfield, Canadian Family Law and the Genetic Revolution: A Survey 
of Cases Involving Paternity Testing, 26 QUEEN’S L.J. 67, 75–76 (2000) (discussing a cultural 
phenomenon of perceiving genetics as an important concept of human relations).  
 157.  See Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 714–16, 45 A.3d 243, 269–70 (2012) (Bar-
bera, J., dissenting) (criticizing the arbitrary nature of the procedure established by the 
majority). 
 158.  See Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 661 A.2d 988, 997 (Conn. 1995) (noting that “[t]he 
social stigma of being branded illegitimate, if indeed it remains at all, no longer carries the 
same sting that it once did”); Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA Based Identity 
Testing and the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 223–24 (2002) 
(discussing the historical legal difficulties of illegitimate children and how the law has 
changed in recent decades); see also Heidi Hildebrand, Because They Want to Know: An Ex-
amination of the Legal Rights of Adoptees and Their Parents, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 515, 522–23 
(2000) (explaining that with the 1970s came a decreased social stigma for single mothers 
and an increase in “adult adoptees . . . asserting their right to know the truth about their 
origins”). 
 159.  In 2011, seven out of ten Americans, in a survey conducted by Pew Research Cen-
ter, said that “single women raising a child without the benefit of a male partner was bad 
for society.”  Amy Lee, Single Mothers ‘Bad for Society,’ Pew Research Center’s Latest Poll Finds, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2011, 3:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/ 
21/single-mothers-bad-for-so_n_825446.html.  The report indicated Americans prefer 
double-parent households, regardless of the parents’ sex, to single-mother homes.  Id. 
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non-traditional families are similarly growing in numbers: many men 
are single parents,160 and same-sex couples now have the right to mar-
ry in Maryland.161  Many children also maintain relationships with fa-
ther figures who are not their biological fathers, including step-
parents.162  While financial support for children is still important,163 
the idea that a child must be raised by a married mother or face social 
stigmatization164 is no longer the case.165  The court’s focus on protect-
ing the presumption of legitimacy, even when it may not reflect bio-
logical fatherhood, is rapidly becoming outdated. 
Second, health reasons make it important for Gracelyn to under-
stand her true genealogy.166 For example, if she needed a bone mar-
row or kidney transplant, her doctors would look first to blood rela-
tives for potential donors.167  The court has no divine ability to discern 
                                                        
 160.  See James Bock, ‘Traditional’ Family Is Fading in Maryland: Two Working Parents Have 
Become the Norm, Study Finds, BALT. SUN (Oct. 19, 1992), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/ 
1992-10-19/news/1992293111_1_maryland-children-working-parents-maryland-children 
(noting that fewer Maryland children live in a home with both parents than ever before); 
see also Yeganeh June Torbati, Rise in Single Fathers Defies Historic Trend, BALT. SUN (May 30, 
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-05-30/news/bs-md-census-single-fathers-201 
10530_1_single-fathers-single-dads-single-mothers (noting the rising number of single-
father households). 
 161.  In 2010, same-sex couples were raising nearly 5,088 children in Maryland.  Extend-
ing Marriage to Same-Sex Couples in Maryland Will Have Positive Effects for 12,500 Couples Rais-
ing over 5,000 Children, WILLIAMS INST. (Feb. 10, 2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla. 
edu/press/press-release/extending-marriage-same-sex-couples-maryland-feb-2012/. 
 162.  Cf. Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Biological and Stepfather Investment in 
Children, POPULATION STUD. CTR. AT THE INST. FOR SOC. RES., UNIV. OF MICH., 5 (Mar. 8, 
2001), http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr01-471.pdf (examining the relative level 
of investment by cohabitating step fathers and father figures). 
 163.  Cf. Mark Mather, U.S. Children in Single-Mother Families, POPULATION REFERENCE 
BUREAU 1 (May 2010), http://www.prb.org/pdf10/single-motherfamilies.pdf (stating that 
in 2010, seven out of ten children living with a single mother were poor or low- income).  
 164.  See JOHN WITTE, THE SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF 
ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 3 (2009) (explaining the historical stigma and legal prob-
lems of illegitimate children). 
 165.  See Torbati, supra note 160 (“‘There’s been a slow shift in the way that men view 
their roles as father, the way that women view men’s role as father, and the opportunities 
for women in the workplace.’”); see also Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the 
Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 596 (2000) (“[C]ourts 
have found that the social stigma and legal disabilities of illegitimacy have diminished 
dramatically . . . .”). 
 166.  The concept of identifying one’s “genetic family” for purposes of identifying ge-
netic diseases and propensities has gained traction in recent years.  See Dolgin, supra note 
143, at 543 (2000) (acknowledging the growing recognition of the concept of “genetic 
family,” particularly in medical texts). 
 167.  See Erica Liepmann & Terry Liepmann, A Mother-Daughter Donation: How Sharing a 
Kidney Saved Our Family, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/erica-liepmann/mother-daughter-donation_b_844687.html (“Typically, relatives 
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when a child will suffer from a medical condition where knowledge of 
her genetic history is paramount.  Faced with the impossibility of pre-
dicting the future, the court should have heeded Judge Eldridge’s 
warning in Turner168 and given Gracelyn the most valuable paternity 
information of all—the truth.  The outcome of the blood test, and its 
revelation of the truth, would not necessarily preclude Gracelyn from 
retaining her current relationship with Thomas Mulligan, and the 
court would still consider her best interests in determining custody.169 
Finally, and most importantly, who is to say what Gracelyn 
wants?170  Would an adult Gracelyn agree with the court’s assessment 
of her best interests?171  It is impossible to say, and that is the point.  In 
light of the uncertainty inherent in determining a child’s best inter-
                                                        
have the best shot at being a match, it’s very rare for biological strangers to be compati-
ble.”).  
 168.  See Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 126, 607 A.2d 935, 945 (1992) (Eldridge, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning against the “‘big brother’ approach” 
of considering the best-interests standard in all cases where a father challenges another 
man’s paternity). 
 169.  See id. (“[T]he majority’s concern over the consequences [of admitting blood test 
results] is overstated.  The admission of the blood test results would do no more than es-
tablish the true paternity of the child.  The best interests standard would still control the 
determination of visitation and custody.”).  After all, “establishing paternity is not a neces-
sary factor to be considered when addressing the issue of custody,” Monroe v. Monroe, 329 
Md. 758, 767, 621 A.2d 898, 902 (1993), and thus Thomas Mulligan could ultimately get 
custody of Gracelyn, even if the test results reveal Corbett to be her biological father.  It is 
important to note, however, that “although an unwed father’s biological link to his child 
does not, in and of itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that 
child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so.”  Turner, 
327 Md. at 115, 607 A.2d at 940 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142–43 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). “When an unwed father demonstrates a full commit-
ment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rear-
ing of his child,’ . . . his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial pro-
tection under the Due Process Clause.”  Id. (quoting Michael., 491 U.S. at 142–43) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 170.  See Jennifer Ludden, Donor-Conceived Children Seek Missing Identities, NPR (Sept. 18, 
2011, 4:01 AM), http://www.npr.org12011/09/18/140477014/donor-conceived-children-
seek-missing-identies.  Ludden described how one woman conceived from a sperm dona-
tion sees hypocrisy when adults determine the best interests of a child: “Couples use donor 
sperm or egg because they very much want at least some biological connection to their 
child.  And yet . . . by using anonymous donors they cut off that child’s other links.”  Id. 
 171.  Research on the desire to find biological parents is lacking in cases where a child’s 
parents are presumed her biological family.  Research is available, however, in cases where 
children know they have been adopted.  Lee H. Campbell et al., Reunions Between Adoptees 
and Birth Parents: The Adoptee’s Experience, 36 SOC. WORK 329, 329 (1991). In those cases, it 
appears that more women than men search to find their biological parents, and that those 
who searched for their biological parents generally knew little about their birth parents 
and engaged in the search to fulfill “a need to know about their birth origins.”  Id.  Sixty-
five percent of adoptive respondents in one study indicated they had reached out to their 
birth parents because they wanted information, such as medical history.  Id. at 332.  
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ests, the court should have allowed Corbett to utilize the Family Law 
Article and order blood testing. 
B.  Even If a Man Must Rebut a Child’s Presumption of Legitimacy, the 
Majority Should Have Accepted Less Evidence to Overcome That 
Hurdle 
The majority’s application of the law makes it nearly impossible 
to rebut the presumption of paternity, as shown by the amount of evi-
dence pointing to Corbett as the biological father of Gracelyn.172  For 
reasons discussed in Part IV.C, a man should not should not be re-
quired to overcome a presumption of legitimacy before employing 
the Family Law Article.  Still, if a man must overcome this burden, he 
should be able to overcome the child’s presumption of legitimacy 
with a showing of any reasonable evidence that he is the biological fa-
ther.173 
A lower burden of proof to overcome a presumption of legitima-
cy is in line with the statutory intent of protecting children’s interests, 
reflects the low likelihood of superficial paternity suits, and avoids the 
problem of “big brother” decisions shielding children from the 
truth.174  A simple showing of any reasonable evidence that the mo-
vant is the biological father should trigger the Family Law Article.175  
Under a reasonable evidence standard the plaintiff must demonstrate 
a real possibility of fatherhood by offering, for example, intimacy, 
proof of extra-marital dating, or the husband’s infertility.176 
A more easily rebuttable presumption would truly reflect the leg-
islature’s concern for child welfare by revealing additional possible 
sources of emotional and financial care.  As discussed above, a man is 
unlikely to bring suit challenging the child’s presumed legitimacy un-
less he truly believes he is the father.177  In the rare case a man knows 
he is not the father but still wants a DNA test, this standard would at 
least require a showing that his paternity is possible.178  This standard 
would also remedy the majority’s overly strong presumption of legiti-
                                                        
 172.  See Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md. 670, 719, 45 A.3d 243, 272 (2012) (Barbera, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the various pieces of evidence). 
 173.  In this case, there was more than sufficient evidence to overcome the presump-
tion.  See id.  
 174.  See Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 126, 607 A.2d 935, 945 (1992) (Eldridge, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 719–20, 45 A.3d at 273 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the evidence presented was sufficient to call Gracelyn’s paternity into question). 
 177.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 178.  See supra note 146–147 and accompanying text. 
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macy by increasing the chance that the truth regarding a child’s pa-
ternity will be revealed. 
Applying the lower standard to the case at bar, Corbett’s and 
Amy Mulligan’s sexual relationship, combined with Thomas Mulli-
gan’s infertility, suffices as reasonable evidence that Corbett is Grace-
lyn’s father.179  Thus, the court should have granted genetic testing to 
determine her paternity.  As it appears almost certain that genetic 
testing would establish Corbett as Gracelyn’s biological father,180 he 
would then be required to pay child support and allowed to establish 
a visitation schedule.181  The Mulligans may very well remain living to-
gether, as they are engaged to be married again, and thus Thomas 
Mulligan’s status as a father figure to Gracelyn would not necessarily 
be altered by the paternity determination.182 
C.  A Better Rule Than the Majority’s Is One That Allows a Man to 
Utilize the Family Law Article Without First Rebutting a Child’s 
Legitimacy 
The court should have used the Family Law Article to retain a 
child’s presumed legitimacy unless and until that legitimacy is fully 
rebutted and re-established in someone else by determinative meth-
ods such as blood testing.183  A claimant should not have to rebut a 
child’s presumption of legitimacy prior to attempting to re-establish it 
in another man.184  For purposes of this Note, this rule is referred to 
as the “rebut and re-establish” rule. 
The Mulligan court found that a claimant must rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy before invoking the Family Law Article be-
cause the Article applies to children born out of wedlock.185  The 
                                                        
 179.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 719, 45 A.3d at 272 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (weighing the 
facts of the case and concluding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Corbett 
was Gracelyn’s putative father and to support a paternity action). 
 180.  Id. at 716, 45 A.3d at 270. 
 181.  Id. at 677, 45 A.3d at 247. 
 182.  Thomas Mulligan’s rights would simply be more akin to the rights of a stepparent.  
See John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 365 (1998) (noting the best interests standard used to determine 
custody rights for step parents in Maryland and Florida).  
 183.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 712, 45 A.3d at 268 (Barbera, J., dissenting).  The purpose 
referred to is, generally, protecting the legitimacy of children to ameliorate the effects of 
single-parent children on both the children themselves and the state.  
 184.  See, e.g., Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 776–77, 621 A.2d 898, 906–07 (1993) 
(demonstrating the court’s desire to presume legitimacy by holding that the unwed moth-
er was not entitled to disestablish paternity of a man who was known to the children as 
their father). 
 185.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 699–700, 45 A.3d at 260–61 (majority opinion). 
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court acknowledged that it treated the terms “illegitimate” and “out of 
wedlock” interchangeably.186  The Maryland legislature, however, does 
not define these terms as equal.  While many courts may treat the 
words synonymously,187 a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for a 
child born into wedlock suggests that the terms are in fact distin-
guishable.  Otherwise, as the dissent noted, the presumption would be 
superfluous.188  The court’s decision thus improperly assumed that 
because children born into wedlock are presumed legitimate, the 
children born out of wedlock are illegitimate, and therefore only the 
paternity of illegitimate children may be contested under the Family 
Law Article.189 
The court should have recognized that a man need not delegiti-
mize a child before asserting paternity under the Family Law Arti-
cle.190  The Article should be understood to preserve a child’s pre-
sumed legitimacy at all times unless and until it is re-established in 
another man.191  This “rebut and re-establish” rule protects the child 
from an ultimate finding that she is not the genetic child of either the 
husband or the challenger; she retains her legitimacy as the child of 
her mother’s husband unless the challenger proves his paternity.192  In 
other words, even if the child is not the genetic child of either the hus-
band or the challenger, she is still considered the legitimate child of 
the mother’s husband from whom financial support can be or-
dered.193 
                                                        
 186.  Id. at 696, 45 A.3d at 258. 
 187.  See, e.g., J.A.S. v. Bushelman, 342 S.W.3d 850, 864 (Ky. 2011) (reviewing bastardy 
and paternity statutes to determine that in legal parlance, “child born out of wedlock,” 
“bastard child,” and “illegitimate child” all mean the same thing). But see D.C. CODE § 16-
907(b) (2012) (stating that “‘born out of wedlock’ solely describes the circumstances that a 
child has been born to parents who, at the time of its birth, were not married to each oth-
er”). 
 188.  See Mulligan, 426 Md. at 709, 45 A.3d at 266 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that if, “as the Majority has decided, a child ‘born out of wedlock’ is ‘illegitimate’ and 
therefore, has no presumed father,” a claim could never arise under the Paternity Article, 
the statutory scheme used to establish the paternity of children “born out of wedlock”); see 
also Daniel v. Daniel, 681 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“Paternity and legiti-
macy are related concepts, but nonetheless separate and distinct concepts.”). 
 189.  See Evans v. Wilson, 382 Md. 614, 646 n.4, 856 A.2d 679, 698 n.4 (Raker, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the legitimacy of a child born out of wedlock could be established by 
proving the paternity of her biological father or retaining the presumption of legitimacy 
under her mother’s husband). 
 190.  See Mulligan, 426 Md. at 712, 45 A.3d at 268 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (noting that 
presumed legitimacy is not necessarily rebutted by a divorce or by a putative father’s filing 
of a complaint to establish paternity). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
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The “rebut and re-establish” rule follows the intent of the legisla-
ture in enacting both the Family Law Article and the Estates and 
Trusts Article by preserving a child’s presumed legitimacy.194  The 
preservation of legitimacy unless and until fully rebutted also reflects 
the reality of paternity suits by giving biological fathers a real oppor-
tunity to assert paternity.195  It is a fairer rule than the one endorsed by 
the majority because it prevents a man from using the Estates and 
Trusts Article to beat another man in a race for paternity.196  Although 
it may not have been Thomas Mulligan’s intention, the practical ef-
fect of the majority’s holding was to allow him to assert paternity over 
Gracelyn by virtue of his relatively early willingness to accept that des-
ignation.  Corbett, and other men desiring genetic testing, should not 
be forced to decide between testing and the opportunity to be named 
father simply because another man is willing to claim paternity with-
out testing.  The majority rule resulted in just that: Thomas Mulligan 
was in the right place at the right time, and unlike Corbett, he did not 
mind if Gracelyn was not his biological daughter.197  This willingness 
to act as father,198 though admirable, should not trump a man who is 
also willing to raise a child, but first requires a paternity determina-
tion.199  Fairness demands that such a man have a chance to establish 
paternity,200 particularly where the child’s mother admits that he is the 
likely father.201  Finally, as explored earlier, a child’s best interests 
cannot definitively be served by preventing blood testing.202  Allowing 
a party access to blood testing to reveal the true biological father of a 
child would prevent “big brother” action by the courts. 
                                                        
 194.  Specifically, the Family Law Article’s purpose is “to promote the general welfare 
and best interests of children . . . .”  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1002 (LexisNexis 2012).  
The purpose of the Estates and Trusts Article is “to simplify the administration of es-
tates . . . .”  MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 195.  See Mulligan, 426 Md. at 712, 45 A.3d at 268 (Barbera, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that an alleged biological father should be able to use genetic testing to help rebut the 
presumption of legitimacy). 
 196.  Cf. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (allowing four ways for a father who is 
not married to the mother to establish paternity). 
 197.  Mulligan, 426 Md. at 681–82, 45 A.3d at 249–50 (majority opinion).  
 198.  The term “father” here refers to the act of raising a child.  Thomas Mulligan never 
maintained that he is Gracelyn’s biological father.  Id. at 716, 45 A.3d at 271 (Barbera, J., 
dissenting). 
 199.  Id. at 682, 45 A.3d at 250 (majority opinion). 
 200.  Corbett asserted his desire to be Gracelyn’s father just twelve days after she was 
born.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 684, 45 A.3d at 251.  
 202.  See supra Part IV.A.3; see also Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 126, 607 A.2d 935, 
945 (1992) (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning against the 
“big brother” approach of considering the best interests standard in all cases where a fa-
ther challenges another man’s paternity). 
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The Mulligan court’s application of the law is not completely 
misplaced: arguably, there are several advantages to its rule, but those 
advantages remain under the rule this Note suggests.  First, by making 
it difficult for a man to assert paternity, the court protects a child 
from the risks of custodial insecurity.203  If it is difficult for a man to 
bring suit to claim a child, and even harder for him to win, the child 
will remain with one father rather than experience the potentially 
traumatic effect of being wrenched between two fathers.204  In Mulli-
gan, however, litigation began when Gracelyn was an infant.205  Thus, 
she will not remember this contest.  It is true, however, that providing 
easier access to the Family Law Article could risk custodial insecurity 
during a much more memorable part of a child’s life, perhaps after 
the child has established a bond with another father figure.206  To 
avoid custodial insecurity, any use of the Family Law Article in cir-
cumstances similar to Gracelyn’s case should be subject to a short 
statute of limitations.207  This would protect the child emotionally by 
preventing suits after a certain early point in the child’s life. 
A second advantage of the majority decision is that it gives sub-
stantial power to the birth mother to recognize the man she would 
like to raise her child, bringing with that recognition the legal rights 
of paternity.208  The idea that a mother knows best for her child, how-
ever, reflects an outdated view of families that does not have a place in 
modern paternity proceedings.209  It is unfair for the court to continue 
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recognizing the decision-making powers of a mother as entirely supe-
rior to those of a father.210  Even so, the substantial tilt of power to-
wards mothers does not completely disappear with the “rebut and re-
establish” rule. Before the statute of limitations expires, the mother 
has the choice whether to contact the biological father and inform 
him of the pregnancy.  After the statute of limitations runs, the child 
is insulated from any man’s attempt at establishing paternity.211  The 
“rebut and re-establish” rule admittedly, and purposefully, does not 
extend as much decision-making power to the mother as does the ma-
jority decision.  True equality of the sexes demands neither the moth-
er nor the father, as a result of their sex alone, have complete and 
unilateral control over an aspect of their child’s life as fundamental as 
paternity.212 
Overall, the Family Law Article is the more appropriate and equi-
table article by which to resolve competing claims of paternity because 
it considers biological factors prior to consideration of the child’s best 
interests.213  Ultimately, the child may retain whatever “modern fami-
ly”214 evolves from her daily atmosphere and support system; the child 
does not need the court to shield her from the truth of her biological 
heritage.215  The court should have endorsed a rule allowing the suit 
to be heard under the Family Law Article while preserving Gracelyn’s 
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legitimacy unless and until it was rebutted and re-established in Cor-
bett. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the legislation and the reality of paternity cases, the 
Mulligan court should have decided the case differently.  The court’s 
requirement that a man overcome a presumption of legitimacy to 
question a child’s biological paternity misses the mark in addressing 
the legislature’s concerns about protecting a child’s legitimacy, fails to 
reflect the reality of paternity actions, and does not necessarily benefit 
the child at the heart of the suit.216 The court should have only re-
quired a reasonable standard of evidence to overcome Gracelyn’s pre-
sumed legitimacy and allowed Corbett to use the Family Law Article.217  
Alternatively, and preferably, the court should have allowed Corbett 
to challenge Gracelyn’s paternity without disturbing her presumed 
legitimacy via a “rebut and re-establish” rule.218  Instead, the court’s 
decision resulted in a child left in the dark as to the identity of her 
true biological father, and a man left without any hope of raising a 
child who is, in all likelihood, his daughter. 
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